Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge by Revesz, Joshua
COMMENT
Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge
Legal scholars, by and large, revile peremptory challenges. Allowing parties
to unilaterally strike prospective jurors without explanation has been attacked
as undemocratic,' as prone to manipulation,' as a potential First Amendment
violation,' and - most often of all - as racist.4 Judges' and even prosecutors'
have spoken out against the procedure. And, although the Supreme Court
sought in Batson v. Kentucky7 to limit the problems of peremptory challenges by
constraining parties' ability to strike jurors because of their race,8 Batson's rule
is decried as "almost surely a failure"' and an "enforcement nightmare."o
1. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and
the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156 (1989).
2. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182
(1995).
3. See Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges
That Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 567, 593-
621 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Altschuler, supra note 1, at 209; Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is
No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure To Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from
Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625 (1994).
5. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("That goal [of
ending racial discrimination in the jury-selection process] can be accomplished only by
eliminating peremptory challenges entirely."); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 788 N.E.2d
968, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) ("[I]t is time either to abolish
[peremptory challenges] entirely, or to restrict their use substantially."); Raymond J.
Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992)
(presenting the argument as a judge on the Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Morris B.
Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 809 (1997).
6. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive
Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369 (2010).
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
8. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson to gender-
based strikes); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to strikes by
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Studies suggest that, despite Batson and its subsequent cases, demographic
profiling remains a principal strategy during voir dire.' Yet some of the same
studies show that, on net, the resulting demographic composition of juries is
similar to that of their venires." As long as parties' race- and gender-based
peremptory challenges can "cancel each other out,"" the argument goes, those
challenges will not produce significant demographic disparities.
This Comment contributes to these debates by noting a different disparity
that peremptory challenges engender. It argues that peremptory challenges
produce an ideological skew in juries. Because ideology and demographics
(particularly race and gender) are asymmetrically correlated in the United
States, demographic-based peremptory challenges alter juries' ideological
criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 5oo U.S. 614, 616 (1991)
(extending Batson to civil cases). The Ninth Circuit has expanded Batson's rule to encompass
peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 475-76 ( 9 th Cir. 2014).
g. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 503 (1996).
1o. William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 SUP. CT.
REV. 97, 134. Shortly before this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court found a Batson
violation in Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349, 2o16 WL 2945233 (U.S. May 23, 2016). The
egregious circumstances of that case-which featured a prosecutor who highlighted and
labeled all black prospective jurors on the venire list, see id. at *5 -underscore the difficulty
of launching a successful Batson challenge.
11. E.g., John Clark et al., Five Factor Model Personality Traits, Jury Selection, and Case Outcomes
in Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 641, 651 (2007); Mary R. Rose, The
Peremptory Challenge Accused ofRace or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23
Law & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 698 (1999); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based
Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the
Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 Law & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 263 (2007).
12. Clark et al., supra note ii, at 651; Rose, supra note ii, at 698. But see Cathy Johnson & Craig
Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and Effect, 18 Law & HUM.
BEHAV. 487, 499, 500 (1994) (finding that peremptory challenges produce racially
homogenous juries).
13. Cf People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (Cal. 1978) (crafting a similar argument with
respect to juror bias, noting that "the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality" is
diversity within the jury pool, because jurors' antagonistic biases will "cancel each other
out").
14. This argument receives mixed empirical support. Compare David C. Baldus et al., The Use of
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 3, 125-27 (2001) (explaining that, in capital punishment cases, the "canceling out"
hypothesis is true for peremptory challenges on the basis of race and gender, but not on the
basis of age), with Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRiM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (2014) (contending that peremptory challenges "favor the side with the
most to gain from majority participation, tilting the balance against the litigant whose most
favorable jurors are few").
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makeup. Specifically, because liberal jurors are easier to identify from
demographic profiling than their conservative counterparts, the peremptory-
challenge regime likely produces more conservative juries than would a system
without those challenges. That bias disadvantages certain litigants, from tort
plaintiffs to criminal defendants.
Part I of this Comment explores the intertwined roles of ideology and race
in the jury-selection process. Part II formalizes this relationship, mapping a
causal claim that peremptory challenges shift jury ideology rightward. It
suggests that peremptory-challenge procedures produce juries that are
considerably more conservative than a random sampling of Americans. This
result reveals an additional axis of identity on which peremptory challenges
discriminate, strengthening the case for curtailing or eliminating the practice.
1. IDEOLOGY, RACE, AND BATSON
Juror ideology matters. Studies show that juror ideology affects outcomes
in both criminal" and civil'6 cases. Litigators agree: the American Association
for Justice, formerly known as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
provides strategies for handling "conservative" jurors;" self-described "jury
consultants" advise lawyers to change their strategies depending on the
15. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 776 fig-3 (2010); James P. Levine, Jury
Toughness: The Impact of Conservatism on Criminal Court Verdicts, 29 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
71 (1983); Shamena Anwar et al., Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Juty Decision
Making 40 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21145, 2015), http://www
.nber.org/papers/w21145.pdf [http://perma.cc/KY 5U-ABDA] ("Our findings imply that
significant biases exist in the Swedish system; biases that are, in fact, closely associated with
positions of the [juror]'s political party."). Dan Kahan prefers the language of "cultural
cognition" to "ideology," as he argues the former term better reflects the "subconscious
influence on cognition" at play in adjudication. Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology in" or "Cultural
Cognition of"Judging: What Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ L. REv. 413, 417 (2o09).
16. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., Cognitions, Attitudes and Decision-Making in Search and
Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 93, lo9 (1988); Roger Giner-Sorolla et al.,
Validity Beliefs and Ideology Can Influence Legal Case Judgments Diferently, 26 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 507, 518 (2002).
17. See Gregory A. Eieseland, Embracing Today's Conservative Juror, in 2 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FORJUSTICE ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (2007).
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ideological makeup of the jury. Even courts, on occasion, acknowledge that
ideology affects jury decision making.' 9
Because juror ideology can play an important role in the disposition of a
case, litigators consider juror ideology when strategizing over peremptory
challenges. Lawyers use peremptory challenges to strike jurors "thought to be
inclined against their interests."' Peremptory challenges, in theory, "assur[e]
the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury"' by "eliminat[ing] extremes of
partiality on both sides."' The Equal Protection Clause, however, constrains
the use of the peremptory challenge. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court
barred the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors solely on the
basis of their race." Yet Batson allows prosecutors to strike black jurors by
asserting that they are striking them not on the basis of race, but on the basis of
their perceived ideological bent. In other words, nothing prevents attorneys
from striking prospective jurors based on their perceived ideologies, and
nothing meaningfully impairs attorneys' use of demographic stereotyping as a
guide to jurors' ideologies.
Post-Batson case law is full of examples confirming the importance of
ideology to litigators during voir dire - and hinting that those attorneys'
perceptions of prospective jurors' ideology are closely linked to those jurors'
race and gender. In multiple cases, in response to a Batson challenge, parties
have (generally successfully) defended their decision to strike minority and
women jurors on the basis of perceived ideology. In a civil suit between a black
plaintiff and white defendants, for example, the defendants explained their
decision to strike an unemployed black woman on the grounds that, based on
those characteristics alone, she would be "an unduly liberal juror."'
18. See, e.g., Harry Plotkin, December 2009 Jury Tip: "Treat Voir Dire Like a Focus
Group" 3 (2009), http://www.youmextjury.com/Decembero9Tip.pdf [http://perma.cc
/K6XL-XBPW].
ig. See, e.g., Vought v. Bank of Am., N.A., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1085 (C.D. Ill. 2012)
(suggesting that "conservative jurors" are "averse to awarding large verdicts"); Pagan v.
State, 830 So. 2d 792, 8io (Fla. 2002) (addressing a defendant's claim that the conservative
makeup of the jury increased the likelihood of conviction).
zo. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990).
21. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
22. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
23. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge
potential jurors solely on account of their race. . . .").
24. Chavous v. Brown, 385 S.E.2d 2o6, 209 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 396
S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 501 U.S. 1202 (1991). The South Carolina Court of Appeals
considered this explanation race-neutral. Id. at 210-11; see also Chandler v. State, 642 S.E.2d
646, 651 (Ga. 2007) (allowing a prosecutor to strike a black juror based on the explanation
that as a black single father, the juror was "not the type of conservative juror that the State
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A simple model of juror psychology - that jurors tend to favor litigants
with similar demographics" - cannot fully explain such strikes. In one case,
the defendant belonged to a different race than the juror the prosecution
challenged;6 in many cases, the challenged juror was a woman and the
defendant was a man.' These cases show the difficulty of separating
demographics from ideology in assessing peremptory challenges: in each
instance, prosecutors struck jurors not because the jurors shared the
defendants' characteristics, but rather because the prosecutors assumed-based
largely on the jurors' appearance-that the strikes would produce an
ideologically favorable jury.
The Batson majority overlooked this phenomenon. Its logic rested on what
Neil Gotanda calls "formal-race analysis," which emphasizes a shallow racial
equality by presuming that "racial classifications are unconnected to social
status or historical experience."8 As Gotanda notes, Batson's argument that
"[a] person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror'"" "invokes that
unconnectedness of a juror's formal-race classification to any other personal
attributes which might relate to jury duty.""o But, in reality, race - and many
other observable characteristics - are correlated with a range of experiences
and attitudes." As Frederick Schauer observed, Batson fails to prohibit "the
use of race as a generalization . . . where the generalization is statistically
legitimate[.]"' Thus, Batson does not stand in the way of attorneys' use of race
as a proxy for ideology.
was seeking"); People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (overturning a
prosecutor's attempt to strike two black women on the grounds that they, as city employees,
would be "liberal jurors"); State v. Flynn, 627 S.E.2d 763, 764 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006)
(allowing a prosecutor to strike every black woman from the jury, including one for whom
the prosecutor's only explanation was that her position as a Head Start director
demonstrated "a liberal type"); Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989) (en banc) (noting that a prosecutor struck a juror because "his being of the Jewish
faith and from Baltimore, Maryland" suggested a liberal ideology).
25. See Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors' Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and
Timing offury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1696-97 (2015) (discussing this theory).
z6. Flynn, 627 S.E.2d at 765.
27. See, e.g., Randall, 671 N.E.2d at 62; Wheeler v. State, 536 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1988);
Flynn, 627 S.E.2d at 765.
28. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,"44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 38 (199.)
29. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
3o. Gotanda, supra note 28, at 42.
3p. Gotanda calls this understanding of race "culture-race." Id. at 56.
32. FREDERICK SCHAUER, 1990 SUPPLEMENT TO GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 226 (iith ed.
1990). Tania Tetlow puts this failure of Batson in starker terms, arguing that the Batson
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In the election-law context, an analogous difficulty has engendered
the "party-race problem." Legislation and redistricting schemes that seek
to weaken Democrats have deleterious effects on minority voters." When
minority plaintiffs-or the Department of Justice on behalf of minority
voters -bring challenges under the Voting Rights Act, Republican legislatures
respond that they sought to disadvantage Democrats, not minorities.' As long
as election manipulation for partisan advantage is legal, it will be impossible to
separate these claims. Similarly, as long as peremptory challenges for
ideological advantage are permissible, it will be impossible to administer
peremptory challenges in a racially neutral manner.
The connection between race and ideology, therefore, poses twin dangers.
First, ideology may serve as a pretext for racially motivated strikes.3 s Second,
ideologically motivated strikes, legal under Batson, may nevertheless be based
on demographic profiling. Part II explores the ramifications of this second
point: it demonstrates that the use of demographic profiling to strike liberal
jurors creates juries that are more conservative than the general population.
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND IDEOLOGICAL BIAS
Independent from the argument that demographic profiling to
discriminate by ideology is merely a pretext for race discrimination,
demographic profiling for ideological discrimination poses additional threats
to overall jury impartiality. Specifically, because ideology and demographics
are asymmetrically correlated, the use of demographic profiling in peremptory
challenges is likely to result in juries that are more ideologically conservative
than the venire population. For this reason, litigants whose positions typically
attract liberal support are hurt by the peremptory-challenge system.
Court "equated race-based peremptories with a determination of what an entire race must
always believe, rather than a potential predictor of those beliefs." Tania Tetlow, How Batson
Spawned Shaw: Requiring the Government To Treat Citizens as Individuals When It Cannot, 49
Loy. L. REv. 133, 139-40 (2003). Tetlow further notes that Justice O'Connor, who voted
with the Batson majority, later described its formal-race rule as "a statement about what this
Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact." Id. at 143 (quoting Brown v. North
Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
33. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts To
Make It Harder To Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARv. L. REV. F. 58, 61 (2014).
34. See id. at 62 (quoting a Texas court filing).
3s. This feature of the ideology-demographic relationship does not present a novel problem:
scholars, activists, and judges have long puzzled over how to deal with allegedly race-
neutral, but racially suspect, peremptory challenges. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A
Proposal To Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRiM. L.
REv. 1099, 1109 (1994).
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A. Stereotyping for Ideological Challenges
Attorneys cannot try their cases during voir dire. They must therefore
use heuristics-what then-Justice Rehnquist called "seat-of-the-pants
instinctsn, 6 - to assess prospective jurors' desirability. "Yet 'seat-of-the-pants
instincts' may often be just another term for racial prejudice"": because
attorneys have no concrete information on which to rely, they often turn to
stereotyping.
Indeed, evidence suggests that attorneys lodge peremptory challenges
based on a small number of easily discernible characteristics. In voir dire,
"questioning jurors is principally a matter of getting basic background
information from which [attorneys] infer likely beliefs and attitudes relevant
to the case being tried.", 8 Stephen Adler observes that "the legal profession
has perpetuated a vast, mostly secretive lore concerning what sorts of people
make what sorts of jurors, and these classifications usually weigh heavily
towards ethnic, class, and racial stereotypes."39 Experiments show that
perceptions of race 4 o and gender41 better predict peremptory challenges than all
other information provided. Justice Breyer has remarked that "the use of race-
and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better
organized and more systematized than ever before."'
To be sure, the opportunities for questioning that voir dire provides might
mitigate this effect: if attorneys can learn more about potential jurors, they can
base their challenges on "beliefs and attitudes" relevant to the case at hand.
But, as Charles Ogletree noted, the "often restrictive nature" of voir dire makes
it difficult for attorneys to acquire relevant, nonstereotypical information about
prospective jurors.43 In many jurisdictions, including in the federal courts,
judges may conduct voir dire and need not provide opportunities for litigants
to ask questions.' A 1994 survey revealed that only fifty-four percent of federal
36. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at io6 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 25 (3d ed. 1992).
39. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 53 (1994).
40. Sommers & Norton, supra note ii, at 267.
41. Michael I. Norton et al., Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying Prohibited Peremptory Challenges, 20
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 467,471 (2007).
42. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
43. Ogletree, supra note 35, at 1126.
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a); GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE
STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 28
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judges allowed attorney questioning during voir dire.4 s There is no reason to
believe that figure has changed dramatically in subsequent decades.
Even when they may ask questions, attorneys might find stereotypes
inescapable. Empirical work suggests that attorneys engage in "biased
hypothesis testing" when asking questions during voir dire-that is, their
questions merely confirm their preexisting hypotheses about prospective
jurors' preferences.4' Despite scholars' advocacy to expand voir dire to allow
attorneys to make better-informed, nondiscriminatory decisions,' attorney
questioning might nevertheless be infected by the stereotypes discussed above.
Reid Hastie has made a similar point, observing that increased attorney
questioning does not assist attorneys in making judgments about prospective
jurors.4 As a result, more attorney questioning may not meaningfully expand
the number of characteristics on which attorneys lodge challenges.
Accordingly-at least as long as demographics are the primary basis for
peremptory challenges-an attorney's success at peremptory challenges will
depend on how ably she can use demographic characteristics to predict the
potential juror's suitability. This process depends, in turn, on the alignment
between demographic characteristics and jury voting patterns. If jurors'
demographic features correlate strongly with their likely votes, the lawyer's job
will be easier. If they do not, her peremptory challenges will add little value.
That match need not be symmetrical. Consider a case where all blue-
eyed jurors are likely to side with the plaintiff but where brown-eyed voters
will likely split evenly. In such a case, the peremptory challenge evidently
advantages the defendant: the defendant's attorney can lodge challenges in
utter surety, while the plaintiffs lawyer must use guesswork.
B. Stereotyping Liberals and Conservatives
Importantly, American demographics manifest this sort of asymmetry.
Some group identities - including those based on race and gender, two of the
features on which peremptory challenges are often based -are highly correlated
tbl.21 (2007), http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS
/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx [http://perma.cc/D4MU-R4WZ) (collecting state practices).
45. Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other Ways To
Improve the Voir Dire Process injury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1179, 1184 (2003).
46. Caroline Crocker Otis et al., Hypothesis Testing in Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 38 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 392, 402 (2014).
47. Ogletree, supra note 35, at u26; Tania Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors Constitutional Rights To
Combat Discrimination, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1157 (2012).
48. Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial
Juries?, 4 o AM. U. L. REV. 703, 722 (1991).
2542
125: 2535 2016
IDEOLOGICAL IMBALANCE AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
with membership in the Democratic Party, a strong indicator of a liberal
ideology. On the other hand, the groups that tend to support the Republican
Party and display conservative ideologies do not have such strong identity-
ideology correlations. This fact could be historically contingent, or a reflection
of a real difference between ideological coalitions." In either event, it has
ramifications for the jury-selection process, as it advantages litigants whose
ideal juror is conservative while harming those who seek a more liberal jury.
To measure this effect, this Comment calculates the likelihood that an
attorney would profile a juror as conservative or liberal, based on the
intersection between the jurors' race and gender. It bases its analysis on 2012
data from the American National Election Study, which asks a nationwide
sample of respondents a battery of political questions every two years.so This
Comment uses the survey's data on partisan affiliation as a proxy for ideology,
rather than looking at data on self-described ideology itself, for three reasons.
First, there is a strong correlation between partisan identity and ideology: a
Pew Research Center study found that "92% of Republicans are to the right of
the median Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median
Republican."s' Second, self-identification of ideology is notoriously unstable,
incoherent, and difficult to define,52 while partisan identification is easy to
understand and to code. Third, studies of other actors in the judicial system
similarly use political party as an ideological proxy.s"
Table 1 shows the results of this methodology. It presents party-affiliation
data, as a proxy for ideology, by race and gender. It sorts these demographic
groups by ideological skew: at the top, black women are overwhelmingly
49. See Matt Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, Ideological Republicans and Group Interest
Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 119, 120 (2015)
(arguing that "the Democratic Party is properly understood as a coalition of social groups,"
while "[t]he Republican Party is best viewed as the agent of an ideological movement").
50. Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC OPINION, at
xxx (Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox eds., 3 d ed. 2010).
si. Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Unformity and
Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RES. CTR. 6
(June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2ol4/o6/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization
-Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/28NF-68SD].
52. See Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND
DISCONTENT 206, 215 (David E. Apter ed., 1964).
s3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts ofAppeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 302 n.1 (2004) (using partisan affiliation of judges'
appointing president as a measure of ideology); see also Todd C. Peppers & Christopher
Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Experiment, 58
DEPAUL L. REv. 51, 60 (2oo8) (using judicial law clerks' political affiliation as a proxy for
ideology).
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Democratic; at the bottom, white men are the most Republican-leaning
demographic.
The Table shows a stark divide. Majority-liberal demographic groups are
overwhelmingly Democratic, while majority-conservative groups are more
mixed. Only about 2.5% of blacks and 17% of Hispanics affiliate with the
Republican Party, while whites are significantly more balanced.
Tablei.
POLITICS BY DEMOGRAPHIC 54
Race Gender Population Dem. Rep. Independent RatioPercentage (Lib.) (Con.) or Other5  (Dem.:Rep.)
Black Female 6.5% 83.5% 1.6% 14.8% 51: 1
6.7% 634%
Hispanic Fcmale 8.8% 51.4% 17.7% 30.8%
HI . 48 6 3 9 : 
White Female 315% 29.3% 33-9% 36.7%
VWhite Mle 2-4.4%:
The implications for jury selection are clear. If a party is seeking to strike
liberal jurors, demographic profiling makes it easy: a black juror is a sure
strike, and Hispanic jurors are also overwhelmingly likely to be left-of-center.
If a party strikes a random member of a majority-liberal group (essentially, a
racial or ethnic minority), that party will eliminate a Democratic juror fifty-
nine percent of the time, while its action will backfire by eliminating a
54. For population percentage data, see USA Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/ooooo.html [http://perma.cc/2JN4-M47G]. The census data show
that 50.8% of Americans are female; I assume that figure is uncorrelated with race. See id.
For party affiliation data, see 2012 Time Series Study, AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUD. (Jan.
25, 2015), http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes-timeseries_2012/anestimeseries
-2o12.htm [http://perma.cc/WY6Z-J7FY]. Party affiliation data (pidself) were examined
by race (dem raceetlx) and gender (genderrespondent x). See User's Guide and Codebook
for the ANES 2012 Time Series Study, AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUD. 93, 361, 682 (May 28, 2015),
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes timeseries-2012/anes timeseries 2012_us
erguidecodebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/50TW-W5NB]. Data were weighted, per ANES best
practices. Matthew DeBell, How To Analyze ANES Survey Data, AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUD.
(May 2010), http://electionstudies.org/resources/papers/neso12492.pdf [http://perma.cc
/Y4VG-X 4 7 F]. This version of the ANES data does not include racial affiliations for Asian
Americans. I use the terms male/female and black/Hispanic/white to mirror the questions
asked of participants in the American National Election Study.
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Republican only ten percent of the time. 6 And of course, if the party focuses
only on random black prospective jurors -precisely the people Batson is
designed to protect - it will succeed even more often.
By contrast, a party seeking to avoid conservative jurors has a much harder
task: if it picks a member of a majority-Republican demographic at random, it
will succeed only thirty-four percent of the time and will eliminate a
Democratic juror on a full twenty-six percent of strikes. This disparity can be
illustrated in terms of expected value: an attempted strike of a liberal will
remove 0.49 more Democratic jurors than Republican jurors from the panel;
an attempted challenge to a conservative prospective juror will remove only
o.o8 more Republican jurors than Democrats.57 In other words, peremptory
challenges targeting liberals are six times more effective, based on no data other
than raw demographics, than strikes targeting conservatives.s8
C. Peremptory Challenges' Right-Leaning Skew
This result distorts juries' ideologies. A simulation of ten thousand juries
suggests that, if parties in a case pursue an ideologically driven peremptory-
challenge strategy based on demographic stereotyping, peremptory challenges
dramatically decrease the number of liberal jurors and increase the number of
conservative ones.59
56. By "majority-liberal group," I mean the four demographics in Table i that skew Democratic.
The averages discussed in these paragraphs are weighted.
si The expected value here is the difference between the Democratic and Republican weighted
averages.
ss. This analysis largely ignores independent jurors. The ideology of independent voters is
hard to parse, and some scholars suggest that independent voters are not typically moderate,
but rather mirror the ideology of the nation as a whole. See, e.g., BRUcE E. KEITH ET AL.,
THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER 200-201 (1992); Alan Abramowitz, The Myth
of the Independent Voter Revisited, U. VA. CTR. POL. (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www
.centerforpolitics.org/crystalbalVarticles/aia2oo9o82ooi [http://perma.cc/6CA6-N5HB]
("The large majority of independent identifiers lean toward one of the two major parties and
these independent partisans are virtually indistinguishable from regular partisans in political
outlook or behavior.... Independents are sharply divided along party lines just like the rest
of the American electorate."). Independent voters do not change the above analysis if they
either mirror the ideologies of partisan voters (as Abramowitz suggests) or hew to some
"centrist" or less-defined ideology.
sg. This analysis makes three simplifying assumptions. First, it assumes that conservative
litigants strike random jurors they believe to be liberal leaning (and vice versa). Second, it
assumes that peremptory challenges are conducted using the struck-jury method, where an
attorney can examine the entire venire of prospective jurors, rather than the more
complicated sequential-selection method. See Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty
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Without peremptory challengesso a twelve-person jury mirroring
nationwide demographics as measured using ANES data would contain 4.6
Democrats, 3.2 Republicans, and 4.2 members of neither party. (Traditionally,
more Americans identify as Democrats than as Republicans.) 6 , In a federal civil
case (each party receives three peremptory challenges)62 in which parties
pursue an ideologically driven peremptory-challenge strategy based solely on
demographic stereotyping, the resulting jury would contain 4.2 Democrats, 3.4
Republicans, and 4.3 members of neither party. In the same circumstances in a
California civil case (six peremptory challenges a side)," the resulting jury
would contain 3.9 Democrats, 3.7 Republicans, and 4.4 members of neither
party. In the same circumstances in a federal capital case (twenty peremptory
challenges a side),* the resulting jury would contain 3.4 Democrats, 4.1
Republicans, and 4.6 members of neither party. Table 2 reports these results.
Those respective scenarios have lo%, i%, and 26% fewer Democrats and
6%, 16%, and 21% more Republicans than the no-challenge baseline. In all
cases, peremptory challenges have the expected effect of striking jurors on the
political extremes and increasing the representation of centrist jurors.6
However, the effect is ideologically uneven: while homogenizing the jury to an
extent, peremptory challenges also skew it rightward.
Within jury Systems, i9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 513, 544 (2012). Third, it assumes all juries have
twelve members.
6o. This analysis assumes that challenges for cause and juror excuses are uncorrelated with
ideology.
61. SeeA Deep Dive into Party Affiliation: Sharp Diferences by Race, Gender, Generation, Education,
PEw REs. CTR. (Apr. 7 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/o4/o7/a-deep-dive-into
-party-affiliation [http://perma.cc/4N76-WZXS].
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012).
63. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(c) (West 2015).
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1).
6s. Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and jury




IDEOLOGICAL IMBALANCE AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Table 2.
SIMULATION OF IDEOLOGICAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
(TEN THOUSAND SIMULATIONS)
Challenges Per Side Democrats Republicans Neither Party
0 4.6 3.2 4.2
3 9 (152/0) 37 (+15.6%) 4.4 (+4.8%)
This stylized simulation tells a troubling story. If-as studies show 6 -
lawyers use race- and gender-based stereotypes as predictors of jurors'
suitability, and if-as evidence suggests 6 ,-perceived suitability is closely
linked to juror ideology, then the peremptory-challenge procedure skews jury
outcomes. It advantages litigants whose success relies on a conservative-
minded jury, while disadvantaging those who seek a liberal jury.
This problem is endemic to the current peremptory-challenge regime. It
could be partly ameliorated, to be sure, by weakening attorneys' reliance on
demographics during voir dire, either by increasing attorney questioning6 8 (if
attorneys seeking to strike conservative jurors could ask about gun ownership,
for example, it would be easier for them to lodge ideological challenges) 6 , or by
requiring jurors to disclose ideologically salient information on their
questionnaires.'o But those ideas are not total solutions. In the election context,
for example, political scientists have shown that voters perceive black
candidates as more liberal than white candidates with identical policy
positions,' suggesting that even hard data cannot overcome demographics in
66. See sources cited supra notes 11, 41.
67. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
6g. See Nate Silver, Party Identity in a Gun Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012, 12:39
A.M.), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.con/2oi2/12/18/in-gun-ownership-statistics
-partisan-divide-is-sharp [http://perma.cc/W59H-V7BG] ("Whether someone owns a gun
is a more powerful predictor of a person's political party than her gender, whether she
identifies as gay or lesbian, whether she is Hispanic, whether she lives in the South or a
number of other demographic characteristics.").
70. New Mexico, for example, requires prospective jurors to disclose their party registration on
the state juror questionnaire. JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE, N.M. CTs, http://www.nmcourts.gov
/jury/files/Juror%2OQuestionnaire.pdf [http://perma.cc/XW5Z-JUYV].
71. Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, From Black and White to Left and Right: Race, Perceptions of
Candidates' Ideologies, and Voting Behavior in U.S. House Elections, 37 POL. BEHAV. 595, 618
(2015).
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determining perceptions of ideology. The connection between peremptory
challenges and ideological bias is thus baked into the peremptory-challenge
procedure.
CONCLUSION
This Comment shows how the use of peremptory challenges may skew
juries ideologically to the right. The data presented add to the robust literature
on the other ways in which unfettered peremptory challenges bias the trial
process.' They also strengthen the case for legislative action to limit or abolish
the peremptory challenge. The peremptory challenge is not a constitutional
right,' but rather is codified in federal statute' as well as in the laws of all
fifty states." Yet, as debate has raged in courtrooms76 and in the media,'
legislatures have stayed silent. Only a few legislatures have considered
proposals to curtail peremptory challenges; no state appears to have restricted
its peremptory-challenge practice since Batson.
Legislatures are slow to act on racial and criminal justice issues.' But
they frequently alter procedural rules to advance their preferred ideological
outcomes in the courts.so Legislative reform of peremptory challenges may
be more easily accomplished, therefore, by stressing the ideological bias of
peremptory challenges and its ramifications in civil cases. Considering
72. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
73. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) ("[R]ather, [peremptory challenges] are but
one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial.").
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012); FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b).
75. See Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Casefor Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 228 n.5 (1986) (listing statutes).
76. See Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349, 2016 WL 2945233 (U.S. May 23, 2016).
77. Adam Liptak, Exclusion of Blacks from Juries Raises Renewed Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/o8/17/us/politics/exclusion-of-blacks-from-juries
-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html [http://perma.cc/T2F4-BBU2].
7s. See, e.g., S.B. 213, 2015-2016 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (proposing to reduce the number of
peremptory challenges in some criminal cases from twenty to six).
79. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 233, 234-35 (2007).
so. See generally THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOcIETY (2002) (discussing various legislative reforms attempted
to facilitate or stymie litigation in different substantive contexts).
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peremptory challenges as a problem of politics as well as a problem of racial
justice may strengthen the case for self-interested legislative action.
JOSHUA REVESZ
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